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Research
AbstrACt
Objectives To assess public attitudes towards data 
sharing to facilitate a mental health screening programme 
for people caught up in a mass casualty incident.
Design Two, identical, cross-sectional, online surveys, 
using quotas to ensure demographic representativeness 
of people aged 18–65 years in England. Participants were 
randomly allocated to consider a scenario in which they 
witness a terrorism-related radiation incident or mass 
shooting, after which a police oficer records their contact 
details.
setting Participants were drawn from an online panel 
maintained by a market research company. Surveys 
were conducted before and immediately after a series of 
terrorist attacks and a large tower block ire occurred in 
England.
Participants One thousand people aged 18–65 years 
participated in each survey.
Main outcome measures Three questions asking 
participants if it would be acceptable for police to share 
their contact details, without asking irst, with ‘a health-
related government organisation, so they can send you 
a questionnaire to ind out if you might beneit from 
extra care or support’, ‘a specialist NHS team, to provide 
you with information about ways to get support for any 
physical or mental health issues’ and ‘your GP, so they can 
check how you are doing’.
results A minority of participants reported that it would 
be deinitely not acceptable for their details to be shared 
with the government organisation (n=259, 13.0%), the 
National Health Service (NHS) (n=141, 7.1%) and their 
general practitioner (GP) (n=166, 8.3%). There was a 
small, but signiicant increase in acceptability for the 
radiation incident compared with the mass shooting. No 
major differences were observed between the preincident 
and postincident surveys.
Conclusions Although most people believe it is 
acceptable for their details to be shared in order to 
facilitate a mental health response to a major incident, 
care must be taken to communicate with those affected 
about how their information will be used.
IntrODuCtIOn 
Following a disaster, terrorist attack or other 
mass casualty incident, rates of mental distress 
and disorder among survivors, their relatives, 
eyewitnesses and first responders can be 
substantial.1 Although evidence-based inter-
ventions are available to treat established 
mental health disorder, failure to seek profes-
sional help for mental illness is common 
as a result of stigma and other barriers to 
care.2 3 Because of this, in their guidance on 
the detection and treatment of post-traumatic 
stress disorder, the UK National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence recommends 
that ‘screening of all [affected] individuals 
should be considered by the authorities 
responsible for developing the local disaster 
plan’.4 Within the UK, the first use of a ‘screen 
and treat’ approach occurred following the 
7 July 2005 bombings in London. A central 
team used a range of methods to contact 
as many people as possible who had been 
strengths and limitations of this study
 Ź The survey sample was demographically represen-
tative of people aged 18–65 years in England.
 Ź The survey was conducted again after the recent 
terrorist incidents and the Grenfell tower ire as we 
felt that the scenarios may have become more sa-
lient for respondents, providing a better test of atti-
tudes towards data sharing in such contexts.
 Ź Although demographically representative, our sam-
ple volunteered to answer internet surveys and may 
be more accepting of data sharing than those who 
did not volunteer.
 Ź The scenarios used in our surveys were hypotheti-
cal. Being directly involved in a major incident may 
alter someone’s views about the desirability of data 
sharing.
 Ź Participants were asked to consider that neither 
they nor anyone they knew well had been harmed 
in the described scenarios. This may have reduced 
the perceived need to participate in a psychological 
screening programme and hence the perceived ac-
ceptability of data sharing.
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caught up in the incident. Those contacted were asked to 
complete a short mental health questionnaire, invited to 
have a more detailed assessment if need be, and referred 
for treatment where required.5 Although the process 
resulted in many patients receiving treatment who might 
not otherwise have done so, difficulties were encoun-
tered in assembling a comprehensive list of people to 
be screened. Sharing of information between agencies 
was hampered by a cautious interpretation of legislation 
designed to safeguard personal data.6 As a result, only 910 
people were contacted out of an estimated 4000 who were 
exposed to the attacks. Within the UK, greater clarity 
about the flexibility that responders have to share infor-
mation was subsequently provided.6 This guidance notes 
that where information is not ‘sensitive’ (ie, related to 
ethnicity, political opinion, religious belief, trade union 
membership, health, sexual life or criminal activity) then 
it is acceptable for names and contact details to be shared 
between official agencies to facilitate the provision of care 
to those affected.
In June 2015, 38 people were killed by a terrorist in 
Sousse, Tunisia. Thirty of those killed were British holi-
daymakers. Given the large number of British tourists 
who witnessed the attacks and felt their own lives to be 
in danger, a psychological health screening programme 
was again set up and subsequently widened to include 
victims of terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris. Public 
Health England was given the task of setting up a registry 
of all English nationals who were directly affected by the 
attacks, something which might also be considered in the 
future for other forms of disaster.7 Once again, however, 
obtaining the contact details for many of those affected 
was not possible. Although the police collected contact 
details from holidaymakers as they returned to England, 
legal advice prevented them from sharing this informa-
tion. Difficulty in sharing information between agencies 
often hampers response efforts following a major inci-
dent. While it is sometimes possible to find more indirect 
routes to contact people, these approaches are often less 
than ideal. For example, while it might be possible for the 
police to send out information to people on behalf of a 
screening service or to ask for permission before sharing 
data, in practice, such strategies can be time consuming to 
agree, often result in a poorer response rate and prevent 
any single agency from combining overlapping lists of 
names held by different groups into a single, consoli-
dated list of those affected.
Clearly, uncertainties still exist about when it is appro-
priate to share information following a major incident. 
Changes to legislation in 2018 will create stiffer penalties 
for organisations found to be in breach of data protec-
tion law and are likely to create an even more cautious 
approach to data sharing. But how members of the public 
themselves view this matter is unclear. Recent polling 
suggests that public attitudes towards data sharing are 
shaped by who is doing the sharing, what for and whether 
safeguards are in place.8 Data sharing for the public good 
is generally viewed positively. For example, only 9% of 
respondents to one large UK survey felt that it would 
be an invasion of privacy if details held about them on a 
cancer registry were used to invite them to participate in 
a study conducted by a university medical school.9 Where 
a personal benefit is possible, people also tend to be more 
willing for information to be shared.10 To our knowledge 
there has been no research on the public acceptability of 
data sharing in the context of a major public health inci-
dent, disaster or terrorist attack.
In this study, we used an online quota survey of a sample 
of adults in England designed to reflect the known popu-
lation profile, to identify public attitudes towards the 
sharing of personal information following a mass casualty 
incident and the setting up of a register of affected people. 
We tested whether attitudes might differ depending on 
whether the incident resulted primarily in a mental or 
physical health risk for those involved in the incident. 
Soon after we conducted our survey, four terrorist attacks 
and a tower block fire occurred in England killing over 
100 people. Given the intense media attention about the 
need to provide support to victims of these incidents, we 
felt that the scenarios described in our survey may have 
become more salient for respondents, providing a better 
test of attitudes towards data sharing in such contexts. 
We therefore repeated the survey with a new sample of 
respondents.
MethOD
Design
We commissioned the market research organisation Ipsos 
MORI to conduct two online surveys of 1000 adult (18–65) 
residents of England. Data collection for the initial, prein-
cident survey took place between 9 and 15 March 2017. 
Four terrorist attacks then occurred in England between 
22 March and 19 June, killing 34, and a tower block fire 
occurred on 14 June, killing 71. Data collection for our 
second, postincident survey took place between 3 and 10 
July 2017. The procedures and questionnaires for both 
surveys were identical.
Participants
Ipsos MORI recruited participants from an existing 
panel of people willing to take part in internet surveys 
(approximate n=160 000). Panel participants typically 
receive points for every survey they complete. For our 
surveys, participants received points equivalent to 30 
pence. Quotas based on participant age and gender 
(interlocked), location and working status were used to 
ensure that the sample was demographically representa-
tive of adults aged 18–65 years in England, according to 
data from the National Readership Survey.11 We excluded 
adults aged over 65 years on the basis that older adults 
who are members of an internet survey panel may not be 
representative of the general population of older adults.12 
We intended to recruit 1000 participants for each survey 
to provide us with a maximum sample error of about ±3%.
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scenarios
Ipsos MORI emailed a link to the survey to potential 
participants. After providing informed consent and 
clicking through to begin the survey, participants received 
questions about one of two hypothetical scenarios. Which 
scenario they received was decided by the survey soft-
ware, based on which scenario had the lowest number of 
completed responses at that time. We based the scenarios 
on an example given in HM Government’s ‘Data Protec-
tion and Sharing—Guidance for Emergency Planners 
and Responders’6 (case study 5). The two versions repre-
sented an incident that might primarily pose a mental 
health threat (witnessing shooting) or a physical health 
threat (exposure to radiation). In the first version, partic-
ipants were asked to ‘imagine that you are on holiday in 
another country and witness a terrorist shooting. Some 
people are badly injured but you are not harmed and 
neither is anyone you know well’. The second version 
asked them to ‘imagine that you are on holiday in another 
country and a place you visit is discovered by police to be 
contaminated by radioactive material. The police believe 
this is linked to a terrorist group. Some people are badly 
injured but you are not harmed and neither is anyone 
you know well’. Participants in both versions were then 
told that ‘the British government arranges for you to be 
flown home, along with other British nationals who were 
in the area. When you arrive back in Britain, a police 
officer at the airport records your name, address, phone 
number and email address. The following questions ask 
about things that might happen next’.
Questionnaire
The supplementary materials show the full text for all 
items. We first presented participants with eight groups 
who might ask the police to share information with 
them following the incident, together with their reasons 
for this. In each case, we asked whether the participant 
thought the police currently could share information 
with this group without asking the participant first, and 
whether the participant thought it was acceptable for the 
police to share their information with the group.
We next provided information about the rationale and 
process for a mental health screen and treat programme. 
We described it as a specialist NHS service set-up to 
offer support and treatment to those who need it and 
explained that a government organisation would support 
the service by putting together a confidential database 
of those affected and writing to them with a screening 
questionnaire. We asked participants to state their level 
of agreement with the statements that ‘ If I was caught 
up in a terrorist incident, I would want the police to give 
my contact details to the government organisation so that 
they can contact me about this service;’ ‘I would want my 
name to be included on this database;’ and ‘I would be 
unhappy if my name was included on this database.’
Participants were then asked to reconsider the scenario 
they had been presented with and told that the police had 
decided to share their name and contact details with a 
health-related government organisation. They were asked 
to state their agreement with 10 statements concerning 
their views about this (eg, ‘it would be an invasion of my 
privacy’).
We asked all participants about their age, gender, 
working status, where in England they lived and their 
highest educational qualification.
Analysis
We calculated the proportion of respondents endorsing 
each response option and assessed the difference in 
responses between the preincident and postincident 
surveys and between the two scenarios using χ2 tests.
Patient involvement
No patients or members of the public were involved in 
the design, recruitment or conduct of the study. Due to 
anonymity, results cannot be disseminated to study partic-
ipants unless they specifically request them from the 
researcher.
results
The top-line results provided by Ipsos MORI for both 
surveys can be found in online supplementary files 1 and 
2.
response rates and demographics
Response rates to the invitation emails were 10% (prein-
cident) and 6% (postincident). These are normal rates 
for surveys of this nature. The lower response rate for the 
postincident survey may reflect the fact that data collection 
occurred during July which coincides with the summer 
holiday period in England. In each case, a small propor-
tion of respondents (45 in total) were excluded from the 
data for completing the surveys suspiciously quickly or 
giving illogically identical answers to multiple consecutive 
questions. Demographics are shown in table 1.
Perceived ability and acceptability of the police sharing data 
with other agencies
Table 2 presents data on the perceived ability of the 
police to share personal data with other agencies. The 
option that was most commonly believed to be within the 
police’s current powers was sharing data with ‘a specialist 
NHS team, to provide you with information about ways 
to get support for any physical or mental health issues’ 
(endorsed by 60.8% overall). 53.9% of respondents 
believed that police could definitely or probably share 
data with ‘your GP, so they can check how you are doing’, 
while 45.9% believed that data could definitely or prob-
ably be shared with ‘a health-related government organi-
sation, so they can send you a questionnaire to find out if 
you might benefit from extra care or support’. No differ-
ences were found between the preincident and postinci-
dent surveys. Significantly more people believed that data 
could be shared following a radiation incident compared 
with a shooting incident with: your general practitioner 
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(GP), a health-related government organisation and a 
specialist NHS team.
Table 3 presents data on the acceptability of the 
police sharing personal data. The option that was most 
commonly seen as being acceptable was sharing data 
with a specialist NHS team (seen as definitely accept-
able by 27.6% and probably acceptable by 44.3%). Most 
respondents believed it was definitely (29.9%) or prob-
ably (40.2%) acceptable for the police to share data with 
their GP, while a smaller number believed it was definitely 
(13.0%) or probably (37.6%) acceptable for data to be 
shared with a health-related government organisation. 
No differences were found between the preincident 
and postincident surveys, aside from a small reduction 
in the postincident data in the acceptability of informa-
tion being shared with medical researchers. Significantly 
more people believed it would be acceptable to share 
their data following a radiation incident compared with 
a shooting incident with: their GP, a team of university 
medical researchers and a health-related government 
organisation.
Attitudes towards data sharing to enable a screen and treat 
programme or database
Table 4 presents the attitudes of participants towards a 
screen and treat programme and confidential database. 
Although most respondents strongly agreed (21.0%) 
or tended to agree (45.6%) that they would want the 
police to share their contact details to allow them to be 
contacted about screening, 10.7% tended to disagree 
and 5.2% strongly disagreed. In total, 51.6% strongly 
agreed or tended to agree with wanting their name to 
appear on the database, while 18.3% tended to agree 
that they would be unhappy if it was included on the 
database and 9.6% strongly agreed that they would be 
unhappy. No differences were found between the prein-
cident and postincident surveys. Because these questions 
asked about ‘a terrorist incident’ in general, we did not 
Table 1 Demographic characteristics of survey respondents
Variable Categories
Frequency (%)
Preincidents Postincidents Total
Sex Male 490 (49) 496 (49.6) 986 (49.3)
Female 510 (51) 504 (50.4) 1014 (50.7)
Age 18–24 119 (11.9) 144 (14.4) 263 (13.2)
25–34 225 (22.5) 222 (22.2) 447 (22.4)
35–44 213 (21.3) 207 (20.7) 420 (21)
45–54 233 (23.3) 226 (22.6) 459 (23)
55–65 210 (21) 201 (20.1) 411 (20.6)
Region North East 46 (4.6) 46 (4.6) 92 (4.6)
North West 137 (13.7) 135 (13.5) 272 (13.6)
Yorkshire and Humberside 98 (9.8) 101 (10.1) 199 (10)
West Midlands 97 (9.7) 101 (10.1) 198 (9.9)
East Midlands 89 (8.9) 84 (8.4) 173 (8.7)
East of England 90 (9) 99 (9.9) 189 (9.5)
South West 95 (9.5) 90 (9) 185 (9.3)
South East 167 (16.7) 166 (16.6) 333 (16.7)
London 181 (18.1) 178 (17.8) 359 (18)
Employment status Working full time 501 (50.1) 509 (50.9) 1010 (50.5)
Working part time 151 (15.1) 140 (14) 291 (14.6)
Self-employed 70 (7) 78 (7.8) 148 (7.4)
Unemployed, looking for a job 49 (4.9) 52 (5.2) 101 (5.1)
Unemployed not looking for a job 105 (10.5) 103 (10.3) 208 (10.4)
Retired 78 (7.8) 56 (5.6) 134 (6.7)
Pupil/student/ in full-time education 46 (4.6) 62 (6.2) 108 (5.4)
Highest level of education 
achieved
Left school without qualiications 33 (3.3) 27 (2.7) 60 (3)
Secondary education 424 (42.4) 413 (41.3) 837 (41.9)
Higher education 538 (53.8) 555 (55.5) 1093 (54.7)
Prefer not to say 5 (0.5) 5 (0.5) 10 (0.5)
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Table 2 Ability of police sharing personal data with other agencies, without asking irst
Agency requesting personal 
information and reason for the 
request
Frequency (%) believing if police are able to share for this reason
Shooting Radiation Ȥ2 Preincidents Postincidents Ȥ2 Total
Your GP, so 
they can check 
how you are 
doing
Deinitely able 169 (16.9) 208 (20.8) 181 (18.1) 196 (19.6) 377 (18.9)
Probably able 328 (32.8) 373 (37.3) 20.521*** 360 (36) 341 (34.1) 1.191 701 (35.1)
Not sure 212 (21.2) 203 (20.3) 206 (20.6) 209 (20.9) 415 (20.8)
Probably not able 184 (18.4) 122 (12.2) 154 (15.4) 152 (15.2) 306 (15.3)
Deinitely not able 107 (10.7) 94 (9.4) 99 (9.9) 102 (10.2) 201 (10.1)
Your travel 
insurance 
company, so 
they can offer 
you practical 
and inancial 
support
Deinitely able 97 (9.7) 93 (9.3) 84 (8.4) 106 (10.6) 190 (9.5)
Probably able 235 (23.5) 230 (23) 1.553 236 (23.6) 229 (22.9) 4.440 465 (23.3)
Not sure 254 (25.4) 263 (26.3) 271 (27.1) 246 (24.6) 517 (25.9)
Probably not able 242 (24.2) 226 (22.6) 236 (23.6) 232 (23.2) 468 (23.4)
Deinitely not able 172 (17.2) 188 (18.8) 173 (17.3) 187 (18.7) 360 (18)
A team of 
medical 
researchers 
from a 
university, so 
they can invite 
you to take 
part in a study 
to improve 
the way future 
incidents are 
dealt with
Deinitely able 38 (3.8) 57 (5.7) 51 (5.1) 44 (4.4) 95 (4.8)
Probably able 123 (12.3) 144 (14.4) 7.437 135 (13.5) 132 (13.2) 1.220 267 (13.3)
Not sure 226 (22.6) 232 (23.3) 221 (22.1) 237 (23.7) 458 (22.9)
Probably not able 314 (31.4) 296 (29.6) 309 (30.9) 301 (30.1) 610 (30.5)
Deinitely not able 299 (29.9) 271 (27.1) 284 (28.4) 286 (28.6) 570 (28.5)
A journalist, so 
they can write 
a news article 
about the 
incident
Deinitely able 27 (2.7) 21 (2.1) 25 (2.5) 23 (2.3) 48 (2.4)
Probably able 52 (5.2) 65 (6.5) 2.929 54 (5.4) 63 (6.3) 1.418 117 (5.9)
Not sure 132 (13.2) 142 (14.2) 133 (13.3) 141 (14.1) 274 (13.7)
Probably not able 203 (20.3) 206 (20.6) 202 (20.2) 207 (20.7) 409 (20.4)
Deinitely not able 586 (58.6) 566 (56.6) 586 (58.6) 566 (56.6) 1152 (57.6)
A charity such 
as the British 
Red Cross, so 
they can offer 
you support
Deinitely able 55 (5.5) 62 (6.2) 60 (6) 57 (5.7) 117 (5.9)
Probably able 201 (20.1) 193 (19.3) 1.593 183 (18.3) 211 (21.1) 3.079 394 (19.7)
Not sure 281 (28.1) 272 (27.2) 281 (28.1) 272 (27.2) 553 (27.7)
Probably not able 266 (26.6) 285 (28.5) 286 (28.6) 265 (26.5) 551 (27.6)
Deinitely not able 197 (19.7) 188 (18.8) 190 (19) 195 (19.5) 385 (19.3)
A health-related 
government 
organisation, 
so they can 
send you a 
questionnaire to 
ind out if you 
might beneit 
from extra care 
or support
Deinitely able 95 (9.5) 116 (11.6) 104 (10.4) 107 (10.7) 211 (10.6)
Probably able 314 (31.4) 393 (39.3) 21.036*** 358 (35.8) 349 (34.9) 0.532 707 (35.4)
Not sure 283 (28.3) 249 (24.9) 266 (26.6) 266 (26.6) 532 (26.6)
Probably not able 185 (18.5) 147 (14.7) 161 (16.1) 171 (17.1) 332 (16.6)
Deinitely not able 123 (12.3) 95 (9.5) 111 (11.1) 107 (10.7) 218 (10.9)
A specialist 
NHS team, to 
provide you 
with information 
about ways to 
get support for 
any physical or 
mental health 
issues
Deinitely able 168 (16.8) 205 (20.5) 179 (17.9) 194 (19.4) 373 (18.7)
Probably able 395 (39.5) 448 (44.8) 22.844*** 429 (42.9) 414 (41.4) 2.120 843 (42.1)
Not sure 218 (21.8) 195 (19.5) 209 (20.9) 204 (20.4) 413 (20.7)
Probably not able 146 (14.6) 89 (8.9) 111 (11.1) 124 (12.4) 235 (11.8)
Deinitely not able 73 (7.3) 63 (6.3) 72 (7.2) 64 (6.4) 136 (6.8)
Continued
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test for differences between the shooting and radiation 
scenarios.
Table 5 presents the broader attitudes of participants 
towards data-sharing in the context of the radiation 
and shooting scenarios. Concerns endorsed by more 
than 50% of respondents about the police sharing their 
information were that: my details would be made public 
by accident, I would be concerned about how my infor-
mation might be used in the future and I would be 
concerned that my details might be shared by the health 
organisation with other groups without my permission. 
Most participants reported wanting to be kept informed 
about how their information was being used. More posi-
tively, 55.4% strongly agreed or tended to agree that 
they would be ‘reassured that a health organisation was 
looking out for me’ and 54.4% would trust the health 
organisation to keep their details secure. No differences 
were found between and preincident and postincident 
surveys. Significantly more people in the radiation than 
the shooting scenario reported that they would be reas-
sured that a health organisation was looking out for them 
and also that they would want to be kept informed about 
how their information was being used. Significantly fewer 
people in the radiation scenario reported that the sharing 
would be an invasion of their privacy.
DIsCussIOn
Our data suggest that not only do the majority of people 
believe that it is acceptable for the police to share their 
details with health agencies in the aftermath of a major 
incident, but that most people believe that the police are 
currently able to do this under existing legislation. This 
belief is not simply due to a broader misunderstanding 
among the public about their data protection rights: only 
8% believe that the police are able to share data with jour-
nalists, for example. Instead, in line with findings reported 
by others,10 it appears that where a direct benefit to the 
individual might result from sharing information with a 
trusted source such as a GP or NHS service, the public 
have a greater acceptability of it, and an expectation that 
it will occur. However, such views were not unanimous 
among our participants. It was notable that 7% of our 
sample thought it was definitely not acceptable for their 
details to be shared with an NHS service following a major 
incident, 8% thought it was definitely not acceptable for 
their details to be shared with their GP and 10% strongly 
agreed that they would be unhappy for their name to be 
included on a confidential database of those affected. 
More people (8%, 9% and 18%, respectively) thought 
these actions were probably not acceptable or tended to 
agree that they would be unhappy. These figures must be 
taken into consideration by responding agencies. Given 
that it is impossible to know in advance who is or is not 
willing for his/her data to be shared, not sharing data 
without prior permission to protect the interests of this 
minority may be a justifiable position in some cases.
Our data provide some indications as to why people 
may be concerned about data sharing following an inci-
dent. In particular, the risk of accidental or deliberate 
sharing of information to a third party was noted as a 
concern by many. If data sharing or the setting up of a 
database is to be considered following any future inci-
dent, a robust policy around further sharing should be 
developed and explained to those affected. Keeping 
people regularly updated on how their data are being 
used is also important. More generally, the nature of the 
incident itself is a determinant of the acceptability of data 
sharing and the use of a database. Participants who were 
asked to imagine a scenario that might pose a long-term 
physical health risk to themselves (eg, possible exposure 
to radiation) were more likely to have a positive view of 
data sharing than those who were asked to consider a 
risk to their mental health (eg, witnessing a shooting). 
Whether this was because participants found it hard to 
envisage that their mental health might be affected in 
the scenarios that we used, or whether this reflects the 
broader stigma associated with mental illness is unclear. 
Similarly, while people may be familiar with the concept 
of physical health effects that develop some time later 
after a radiation incident, they may be less familiar with 
the concept of mental health effects that only become 
apparent later: this lack of understanding may also have 
reduced the perceived desirability of a mental health 
screening programme across both conditions. It is 
Agency requesting personal 
information and reason for the 
request
Frequency (%) believing if police are able to share for this reason
Shooting Radiation Ȥ2 Preincidents Postincidents Ȥ2 Total
A law irm, so 
they can offer 
to represent 
you in a ‘no-
win, no-fee’ 
claim for 
compensation
Deinitely able 41 (4.1) 33 (3.3) 36 (3.6) 38 (3.8) 74 (3.7)
Probably able 87 (8.7) 94 (9.4) 6.087 91 (9.1) 90 (9) 0.121 181 (9.1)
Not sure 164 (16.4) 197 (19.7) 182 (18.2) 179 (17.9) 361 (18.1)
Probably not able 245 (24.5) 253 (25.3) 247 (24.7) 251 (25.1) 498 (24.9)
Deinitely not able 463 (46.3) 423 (42.3) 444 (44.4) 442 (44.2) 886 (44.3)
***P<0.001.
GP, general practitioner; NHS, National Health Service.
Table 2 Continued 
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Table 3 Acceptability of police sharing personal data with other agencies, without asking irst
Agency requesting personal information 
and reason for the request
Frequency (%) believing if it is acceptable for the police to share for this reason
Shooting Radiation Ȥ2 Preincidents Postincidents Ȥ2 Total
Your GP, so they can 
check how you are 
doing
Deinitely acceptable 274 (27.4) 324 (32.4) 297 (29.7) 301 (30.1) 598 (29.9)
Probably acceptable 400 (40) 404 (40.4) 10.352* 394 (39.4) 410 (41) 3.490 804 (40.2)
Not sure 131 (13.1) 120 (12) 121 (12.1) 130 (13) 251 (12.6)
Probably not 
acceptable
99 (9.9) 82 (8.2) 101 (10.1) 80 (8) 181 (9.1)
Deinitely not 
acceptable
96 (9.6) 70 (7) 87 (8.7) 79 (7.9) 166 (8.3)
Your travel insurance 
company, so 
they can offer 
you practical and 
inancial support
Deinitely acceptable 107 (10.7) 114 (11.4) 113 (11.3) 108 (10.8) 221 (11.1)
Probably acceptable 291 (29.1) 271 (27.1) 2.649 274 (27.4) 288 (28.8) 3.338 562 (28.1)
Not sure 214 (21.4) 222 (22.2) 232 (23.2) 204 (20.4) 436 (21.8)
Probably not 
acceptable
175 (17.5) 160 (16) 158 (15.8) 177 (17.7) 335 (16.8)
Deinitely not 
acceptable
213 (21.3) 233 (23.3) 223 (22.3) 223 (22.3) 446 (22.3)
A team of medical 
researchers from a 
university, so they 
can invite you to 
take part in a study 
to improve the way 
future incidents are 
dealt with
Deinitely acceptable 42 (4.2) 70 (7) 63 (6.3) 49 (4.9) 112 (5.6)
Probably acceptable 174 (17.4) 206 (20.6) 16.001** 203 (20.3) 177 (17.7) 9.797* 380 (19)
Not sure 221 (22.1) 238 (23.8) 214 (21.4) 245 (24.5) 459 (22.9)
Probably not 
acceptable
268 (26.8) 229 (22.9) 230 (23) 267 (26.7) 497 (24.9)
Deinitely not 
acceptable
295 (29.5) 257 (25.7) 290 (29) 262 (26.2) 552 (27.6)
A journalist, so they 
can write a news 
article about the 
incident
Deinitely acceptable 17 (1.7) 17 (1.7) 16 (1.6) 18 (1.8) 34 (1.7)
Probably acceptable 42 (4.2) 49 (4.9) 2.439 43 (4.3) 48 (4.8) 4.709 91 (4.6)
Not sure 85 (8.5) 100 (10) 84 (8.4) 101 (10.1) 185 (9.3)
Probably not 
acceptable
143 (14.3) 149 (14.9) 136 (13.6) 156 (15.6) 292 (14.6)
Deinitely not 
acceptable
713 (71.3) 685 (68.5) 721 (72.1) 677 (67.7) 1398 (69.9)
A charity such as the 
British Red Cross, 
so they can offer you 
support
Deinitely acceptable 72 (7.2) 75 (7.5) 75 (7.5) 72 (7.2) 147 (7.4)
Probably acceptable 277 (27.7) 291 (29.1) 1.183 270 (27) 298 (29.8) 3.131 568 (28.4)
Not sure 260 (26) 245 (24.5) 254 (25.4) 251 (25.1) 505 (25.3)
Probably not 
acceptable
205 (20.5) 196 (19.6) 199 (19.9) 202 (20.2) 401 (20.1)
Deinitely not 
acceptable
186 (18.6) 193 (19.3) 202 (20.2) 177 (17.7) 379 (18.9)
A health-related 
government 
organisation, so 
they can send you 
a questionnaire to 
ind out if you might 
beneit from extra 
care or support
Deinitely acceptable 108 (10.8) 152 (15.2) 132 (13.2) 128 (12.8) 260 (13)
Probably acceptable 370 (37) 383 (38.3) 11.036* 361 (36.1) 392 (39.2) 2.502 753 (37.6)
Not sure 229 (22.9) 208 (20.8) 225 (22.5) 212 (21.2) 437 (21.9)
Probably not 
acceptable
155 (15.5) 136 (13.6) 153 (15.3) 138 (13.8) 291 (14.6)
Deinitely not 
acceptable
138 (13.8) 121 (12.1) 129 (12.9) 130 (13) 259 (13)
A specialist NHS 
team, to provide 
you with information 
about ways to get 
support for any 
physical or mental 
health issues
Deinitely acceptable 258 (25.8) 294 (29.4) 271 (27.1) 281 (28.1) 552 (27.6)
Probably acceptable 438 (43.8) 448 (44.8) 6.897 440 (44) 446 (44.6) 0.978 886 (44.3)
Not sure 138 (13.8) 126 (12.6) 139 (13.9) 125 (12.5) 264 (13.2)
Probably not 
acceptable
87 (8.7) 70 (7) 79 (7.9) 78 (7.8) 157 (7.9)
Deinitely not 
acceptable
79 (7.9) 62 (6.2) 71 (7.1) 70 (7) 141 (7.1)
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important also not to overstate the differences that we 
observed, however. Although statistically significant, in 
many cases these were small. Nonetheless, additional care 
might be required when communicating with the public 
about data sharing that is primarily intended to support a 
mental health response. It is possible that ongoing public 
campaigns to improve the understanding of mental 
ill-health may impact on these differences over time.
limitations
Several limitations with our data need to be considered. 
First, we restricted our sample to people aged 18–65 years. 
We are unable to extrapolate from our data to those 
older or younger than this. Second, although our sample 
was demographically representative of people aged 18– 
65 years in England, it may not have been psychologically 
representative of this population. In particular, it seems 
plausible that people who volunteer to answer internet 
surveys may be more accepting of data sharing than 
those who do not volunteer. If anything, our estimate of 
the number of people expressing reticence about data 
sharing is therefore likely to be an underestimate. Third, 
the scenarios used in our surveys were hypothetical. We 
hoped that repeating our survey soon after a series of 
terrorist attacks and a major disaster would make the 
issues involved more salient for participants. Doing this 
did not alter our results, possibly reflecting the fact that 
participants in our first survey were already thinking care-
fully about the scenarios that we presented. Nonetheless, 
it is possible that being directly involved in a major inci-
dent would alter someone’s views about the desirability of 
data sharing. Fourth, for ethical reasons, we asked partici-
pants to consider that neither they nor anyone they knew 
well had been harmed in the scenarios that we described. 
This may have reduced the perceived need to participate 
Agency requesting personal information 
and reason for the request
Frequency (%) believing if it is acceptable for the police to share for this reason
Shooting Radiation Ȥ2 Preincidents Postincidents Ȥ2 Total
A law irm, so 
they can offer to 
represent you in 
a ‘no-win, no-
fee’ claim for 
compensation
Deinitely acceptable 31 (3.1) 28 (2.8) 32 (3.2) 27 (2.7) 59 (3)
Probably acceptable 76 (7.6) 85 (8.5) 2.796 83 (8.3) 78 (7.8) 6.699 161 (8.1)
Not sure 137 (13.7) 128 (12.8) 127 (12.7) 138 (13.8) 265 (13.3)
Probably not 
acceptable
166 (16.6) 189 (18.9) 158 (15.8) 197 (19.7) 355 (17.8)
Deinitely not 
acceptable
590 (59) 570 (57) 600 (60) 560 (56) 1160 (58)
*P<0.05; **P<0.01.
GP, general practitioner; NHS, National Health Service. 
Table 3 Continued 
Table 4 Attitudes towards proposed conidential database
If I was caught up in a terrorist incident
Frequency (%) of agreement
Preincidents Postincidents Ȥ2 Total
I would want the police to give my contact details 
to the government organisation so that they can 
contact me about this service
Strongly agree 209 (20.9) 211 (21.1) 420 (21)
Tend to agree 454 (45.4) 458 (45.8) 3.918 912 (45.6)
Neither 177 (17.7) 175 (17.5) 352 (17.6)
Tend to disagree 116 (11.6) 97 (9.7) 213 (10.7)
Strongly disagree 44 (4.4) 59 (5.9) 103 (5.2)
I would want my name to be included on this 
database
Strongly agree 143 (14.3) 135 (13.5) 278 (13.9)
Tend to agree 388 (38.8) 366 (36.6) 3.333 754 (37.7)
Neither 242 (24.2) 265 (26.5) 507 (25.4)
Tend to disagree 156 (15.6) 149 (14.9) 305 (15.3)
Strongly disagree 71 (7.1) 85 (8.5) 156 (7.8)
I would be unhappy if my name was included on 
this database
Strongly agree 89 (8.9) 102 (10.2) 191 (9.6)
Tend to agree 181 (18.1) 185 (18.5) 2.470 366 (18.3)
Neither 305 (30.5) 280 (28) 585 (29.3)
Tend to disagree 323 (32.3) 321 (32.1) 644 (32.2)
Strongly disagree 102 (10.2) 112 (11.2) 214 (10.7)
These data were not split by scenario type, as it regarded a different scenario to that originally posed to participants.
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Table 5 Attitudes towards contact details being shared with another agency by the police
Imagine the scenario we described 
occurred and the police decided to share 
your name and contact information with a 
health-related government organisation
Frequency (%) of agreement
Shooting Radiation Ȥ2 Preincidents Postincidents Ȥ2 Total
I would be concerned 
that my details would be 
made public by accident
Strongly agree 290 (29) 239 (23.9) 259 (25.9) 270 (27) 529 (26.4)
Tend to agree 360 (26) 363 (36.3) 10.004* 365 (36.5) 358 (35.8) 0.742 723 (36.1)
Neither 201 (20.1) 223 (22.3) 217 (21.7) 207 (20.7) 424 (21.2)
Tend to disagree 130 (13) 143 (14.3) 135 (13.5) 138 (13.8) 273 (13.7)
Strongly disagree 19 (1.9) 32 (3.2) 24 (2.4) 27 (2.7) 51 (2.6)
I would trust the health 
organisation to keep my 
details secure
Strongly agree 152 (15.2) 161 (16.1) 171 (17.1) 142 (14.2) 313 (15.7)
Tend to agree 363 (36.3) 411 (41.1) 8.537 375 (37.5) 399 (39.9) 7.741 774 (38.7)
Neither 266 (26.6) 245 (24.5) 256 (25.6) 255 (25.5) 511 (25.6)
Tend to disagree 164 (16.4) 128 (12.8) 153 (15.3) 139 (13.9) 292 (14.6)
Strongly disagree 55 (5.5) 55 (5.5) 45 (4.5) 65 (6.5) 110 (5.5)
It would be an invasion 
of my privacy
Strongly agree 191 (19.1) 159 (15.9) 164 (16.4) 186 (18.6) 350 (17.5)
Tend to agree 255 (25.5) 227 (22.7) 15.770** 246 (24.6) 236 (23.6) 2.549 482 (24.1)
Neither 306 (30.6) 288 (28.8) 293 (29.3) 301 (30.1) 594 (29.7)
Tend to disagree 204 (20.4) 271 (27.1) 244 (24.4) 231 (23.1) 475 (23.8)
Strongly disagree 44 (4.4) 55 (5.5) 53 (5.3) 46 (4.6) 99 (5)
I would be concerned 
about how my 
information might be 
used in the future
Strongly agree 297 (29.7) 251 (25.1) 266 (26.6) 282 (28.2) 548 (27.4)
Tend to agree 394 (39.4) 414 (41.4) 6.237 405 (40.5) 403 (40.3) 1.755 808 (40.4)
Neither 177 (17.7) 203 (20.3) 192 (19.2) 188 (18.8) 380 (19)
Tend to disagree 107 (10.7) 109 (10.9) 115 (11.5) 101 (10.1) 216 (10.8)
Strongly disagree 25 (2.5) 23 (2.3) 22 (2.2) 26 (2.6) 48 (2.4)
I would be concerned 
that my employer would 
be told information 
about me
Strongly agree 116 (11.6) 109 (10.9) 115 (11.5) 110 (11) 225 (11.3)
Tend to agree 232 (23.2) 227 (22.7) 0.847 228 (22.2) 231 (23.1) 0.738 459 (45.9)
Neither 281 (28.1) 298 (29.8) 284 (28.4) 295 (29.5) 579 (28.9)
Tend to disagree 261 (26.1) 260 (26) 267 (26.7) 254 (25.4) 521 (26.1)
Strongly disagree 110 (11) 106 (10.6) 106 (10.6) 110 (11) 216 (10.8)
I would be concerned 
that my details might 
be shared by the health 
organisation with other 
groups without my 
permission
Strongly agree 273 (27.3) 233 (23.3) 245 (24.5) 261 (26.1) 506 (25.3)
Tend to agree 384 (38.4) 380 (38) 8.629 382 (38.2) 382 (38.2) 2.127 764 (38.2)
Neither 201 (20.1) 245 (24.5) 227 (22.7) 219 (21.9) 446 (22.3)
Tend to disagree 111 (11.1) 118 (11.8) 114 (11.4) 115 (11.5) 229 (11.5)
Strongly disagree 31 (3.1) 24 (2.4) 32 (3.2) 23 (2.3) 55 (2.8)
I would want to be kept 
informed about how my 
information was being 
used
Strongly agree 509 (50.9) 489 (48.9) 518 (51.8) 480 (48) 998 (49.9)
Tend to agree 340 (34) 357 (35.7) 9.692* 339 (33.9) 358 (35.8) 5.162 697 (34.9)
Neither 114 (11.4) 128 (12.8) 109 (10.9) 133 (13.3) 242 (12.1)
Tend to disagree 24 (2.4) 24 (2.4) 27 (2.7) 21 (2.1) 48 (2.4)
Strongly disagree 13 (1.3) 2 (0.2) 7 (0.7) 8 (0.8) 15 (0.8)
It would not bother me 
at all
Strongly agree 58 (5.8) 72 (7.2) 64 (6.4) 66 (6.6) 130 (6.5)
Tend to agree 204 (20.4) 222 (22.2) 7.131 202 (20.3) 224 (22.4) 2.232 426 (21.3)
Neither 308 (30.8) 330 (33) 332 (33.2) 306 (30.6) 638 (31.9)
Tend to disagree 270 (27) 245 (24.5) 257 (25.7) 258 (25.8) 515 (25.8)
Strongly disagree 160 (16) 131 (13.1) 145 (14.5) 146 (14.6) 291 (14.6)
I would be reassured 
that a health organisation 
was looking out for me
Strongly agree 107 (10.7) 148 (14.8) 137 (13.7) 118 (11.8) 255 (12.8)
Tend to agree 425 (42.5) 427 (42.7) 12.829* 415 (41.5) 437 (43.7) 7.791 852 (42.6)
Neither 305 (30.5) 302 (30.2) 319 (31.9) 288 (28.8) 607 (60.7)
Tend to disagree 112 (11.2) 79 (7.9) 91 (9.1) 100 (10) 191 (9.6)
Strongly disagree 51 (5.1) 44 (4.4) 38 (3.8) 57 (5.7) 95 (4.8)
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in a psychological screening programme and hence the 
perceived acceptability of data sharing. People who are 
injured, bereaved or otherwise harmed in an incident 
may be more willing for their data to be shared. Finally, we 
have no information on our participants’ previous expe-
riences of data sharing or data protection breaches. Prior 
experience of breaches, from whatever source or agency, 
may make people more reluctant to consider future data 
sharing. This may be relevant for the minority of people 
in our sample who were reluctant to share data. It would 
also reinforce the need for clear information and reassur-
ance about data handling. 
COnClusIOn
Disagreement often exists between officials and agencies 
about the appropriateness of, and best mechanisms for, 
data sharing in the aftermath of a major incident. These 
disagreements are also apparent among members of the 
public: while most support the sharing of data between 
the police and health services in order to facilitate public 
health measures, this is by no means a unanimous view. 
The absence of a clear consensus reinforces the view that 
agencies should consider the benefits and risks of sharing 
data with organisations that seek to protect their mental 
health. In order to assuage public concerns, agencies who 
hold such data should communicate to the public their 
policies for securely holding the data and for updating 
people on how the data will be used.
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Imagine the scenario we described 
occurred and the police decided to share 
your name and contact information with a 
health-related government organisation
Frequency (%) of agreement
Shooting Radiation Ȥ2 Preincidents Postincidents Ȥ2 Total
I would be concerned 
that my GP might be told
Strongly agree 44 (4.4) 42 (4.2) 41 (4.1) 45 (4.5) 86 (4.3)
Tend to agree 102 (10.2) 89 (8.9) 2.679 90 (9) 101 (10.1) 3.554 191 (9.6)
Neither 296 (29.6) 277 (27.7) 292 (29.2) 281 (28.1) 573 (28.7)
Tend to disagree 369 (36.9) 397 (39.7) 397 (39.7) 369 (36.9) 766 (38.3)
Strongly disagree 189 (18.9) 195 (19.5) 180 (18)  204 (20.4) 384 (19.2)
*P<0.05; **P<0.01.
GP, general practitioner.
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